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1"use strict";

3const test = require("node:test");

4const assert = require("node:assert/strict");

5const fs = require("node:fs");

6const os = require("node:os");

7const path = require("node:path");

8const openpgp = require("openpgp");

9const {

10 OpenPgpVerifier,

11 TRUSTED_PRIMARY_FINGERPRINT,

12 normalizeFingerprint

13} = require("../src/main/updates/openPgpVerifier");

14const { UpdateService } = require("../src/main/updates/updateService");

16let fixturePromise;

18async function fixtures() {

19 if (!fixturePromise) {

20 fixturePromise = (async () => {

21 const trusted = await openpgp.generateKey({

22 type: "ecc",

23 curve: "ed25519Legacy",

24 userIDs: [{ name: "CH-J updater test key" }],

25 subkeys: [{ sign: true }, { sign: true }],

26 format: "object"

27 });

28 const foreign = await openpgp.generateKey({

29 type: "ecc",

30 curve: "ed25519Legacy",

31 userIDs: [{ name: "Foreign updater test key" }],

32 subkeys: [{ sign: true }],

33 format: "object"

34 });

35 return {

36 trustedPrivateArmor: trusted.privateKey.armor(),

37 trustedPublicArmor: trusted.publicKey.armor(),

38 trustedFingerprint: normalizeFingerprint(trusted.publicKey.getFingerprint()),

        trustedSigningFingerprints: trusted.publicKey.getSubkeys().map((key) => normalizeFingerprint(key.getFingerprint())),

40 foreignPrivateArmor: foreign.privateKey.armor(),

41 foreignPublicArmor: foreign.publicKey.armor(),

42 foreignFingerprint: normalizeFingerprint(foreign.publicKey.getFingerprint())

43 };

44 })();

45 }

46 return fixturePromise;

47}

49async function detachedSignature(privateArmor, bytes, subkeyIndex = 0) {

50 const privateKey = await openpgp.readPrivateKey({ armoredKey: privateArmor });

51 return openpgp.sign({

52 message: await openpgp.createMessage({ binary: bytes }),

53 signingKeys: privateKey,

54 signingKeyIDs: privateKey.getSubkeys()[subkeyIndex].getKeyID(),

55 detached: true,

56 format: "armored"

57 });

58}

60function verificationFiles(t, publicArmor, bytes, signature) {

61 const root = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "chj-openpgp-test-"));

62 t.after(() => fs.rmSync(root, { recursive: true, force: true }));

63 const publicKeyPath = path.join(root, "trusted.asc");

64 const artifactPath = path.join(root, "update.bin");

65 const signaturePath = path.join(root, "update.bin.asc");

66 fs.writeFileSync(publicKeyPath, publicArmor, { mode: 0o600 });

67 fs.writeFileSync(artifactPath, bytes, { mode: 0o600 });

68 if (signature !== null) fs.writeFileSync(signaturePath, signature, { mode: 0o600 });

69 return { publicKeyPath, artifactPath, signaturePath };

70}

72function verifierFor(files, trustedPrimaryFingerprint, options = {}) {

73 return new OpenPgpVerifier({

74 publicKeyPath: files.publicKeyPath,

75 trustedPrimaryFingerprint,

76 ...options

77 });

78}

80test("bundled production certificate has the hardcoded trusted primary fingerprint", async () => {

81 const armoredKey = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, "..", "ch-j-signing-public.asc"), "utf8");

82 const key = await openpgp.readKey({ armoredKey });

83 assert.equal(normalizeFingerprint(key.getFingerprint()), TRUSTED_PRIMARY_FINGERPRINT);

84 await key.verifyPrimaryKey(new Date());

85 const signingSubkey = key.getSubkeys()[0];

86 assert.ok(signingSubkey, "production signing subkey is missing");

87 const binding = await signingSubkey.verify(new Date());

88 assert.ok([...binding.keyFlags].some((flags) => (flags & openpgp.enums.keyFlags.signData) !== 0));

89});

91test("valid file and detached signature by a trusted signing subkey pass", async (t) => {

92 const fixture = await fixtures();

93 const bytes = Buffer.from("authentic update artifact");

94 const signature = await detachedSignature(fixture.trustedPrivateArmor, bytes, 0);

95 const files = verificationFiles(t, fixture.trustedPublicArmor, bytes, signature);

  const result = await verifierFor(files, fixture.trustedFingerprint).verifyFile(files.artifactPath, files.signaturePath);

97 assert.equal(result.valid, true);

98 assert.deepEqual(result.signingFingerprints, [fixture.trustedSigningFingerprints[0]]);

99});

100

101test("an artifact changed after signing is rejected", async (t) => {

102 const fixture = await fixtures();

103 const signature = await detachedSignature(fixture.trustedPrivateArmor, Buffer.from("original"));

104 const files = verificationFiles(t, fixture.trustedPublicArmor, Buffer.from("modified"), signature);

105 await assert.rejects(

106 () => verifierFor(files, fixture.trustedFingerprint).verifyFile(files.artifactPath, files.signaturePath),

107 (error) => error.code === "UPDATE_SIGNATURE_INVALID"

108 );

109});

110

111test("a missing signature is rejected", async (t) => {

112 const fixture = await fixtures();

113 const files = verificationFiles(t, fixture.trustedPublicArmor, Buffer.from("update"), null);

114 await assert.rejects(

115 () => verifierFor(files, fixture.trustedFingerprint).verifyFile(files.artifactPath, files.signaturePath),

116 (error) => error.code === "UPDATE_SIGNATURE_FILE_MISSING"

117 );

118});

119

120test("an empty or malformed signature is rejected", async (t) => {

121 const fixture = await fixtures();

122 const empty = verificationFiles(t, fixture.trustedPublicArmor, Buffer.from("update"), "");

123 await assert.rejects(

124 () => verifierFor(empty, fixture.trustedFingerprint).verifyFile(empty.artifactPath, empty.signaturePath),

125 (error) => error.code === "UPDATE_SIGNATURE_EMPTY"

126 );

127 const malformed = verificationFiles(t, fixture.trustedPublicArmor, Buffer.from("update"), "not an OpenPGP signature");

128 await assert.rejects(

129

    () => verifierFor(malformed, fixture.trustedFingerprint).verifyFile(malformed.artifactPath, malformed.signaturePath),

130 (error) => error.code === "UPDATE_SIGNATURE_MALFORMED"

131 );

132});

133

134test("a valid signature from an unrelated keypair is rejected", async (t) => {

135 const fixture = await fixtures();

136 const bytes = Buffer.from("foreign update");

137 const signature = await detachedSignature(fixture.foreignPrivateArmor, bytes);

138 const files = verificationFiles(t, fixture.trustedPublicArmor, bytes, signature);

139 await assert.rejects(

140 () => verifierFor(files, fixture.trustedFingerprint).verifyFile(files.artifactPath, files.signaturePath),

141 (error) => error.code === "UPDATE_SIGNATURE_INVALID" || error.code === "UPDATE_SIGNATURE_UNTRUSTED_SIGNER"

142 );

143});

144

145test("a public certificate with a different primary fingerprint is rejected", async (t) => {

146 const fixture = await fixtures();

147 const bytes = Buffer.from("update");

148 const signature = await detachedSignature(fixture.foreignPrivateArmor, bytes);

149 const files = verificationFiles(t, fixture.foreignPublicArmor, bytes, signature);

150 await assert.rejects(

151 () => verifierFor(files, fixture.trustedFingerprint).verifyFile(files.artifactPath, files.signaturePath),

152 (error) => error.code === "UPDATE_PUBLIC_KEY_FINGERPRINT_MISMATCH"

153 );

154});

155

156test("a second future signing subkey bound to the same primary key passes", async (t) => {

157 const fixture = await fixtures();

158 const bytes = Buffer.from("future subkey update");

159 const signature = await detachedSignature(fixture.trustedPrivateArmor, bytes, 1);

160 const files = verificationFiles(t, fixture.trustedPublicArmor, bytes, signature);

161

  const result = await verifierFor(files, fixture.trustedFingerprint).verifyFile(files.artifactPath, files.signaturePath);

162 assert.equal(result.valid, true);

163 assert.deepEqual(result.signingFingerprints, [fixture.trustedSigningFingerprints[1]]);

164});

165

166test("a revoked signing subkey is rejected", async (t) => {

167 const fixture = await fixtures();

168 const bytes = Buffer.from("revoked subkey update");

169 const signature = await detachedSignature(fixture.trustedPrivateArmor, bytes, 0);

170 const privateKey = await openpgp.readPrivateKey({ armoredKey: fixture.trustedPrivateArmor });

171 privateKey.subkeys[0] = await privateKey.subkeys[0].revoke(

172 privateKey.keyPacket,

173 { flag: openpgp.enums.reasonForRevocation.keyRetired, string: "Updater test revocation" },

174 new Date()

175 );

176 const files = verificationFiles(t, privateKey.toPublic().armor(), bytes, signature);

177 await assert.rejects(

178 () => verifierFor(files, fixture.trustedFingerprint).verifyFile(files.artifactPath, files.signaturePath),

179

    (error) => ["UPDATE_SIGNATURE_INVALID", "UPDATE_SIGNATURE_UNTRUSTED_SIGNER", "UPDATE_SIGNING_SUBKEY_INVALID"].includes(error.code)

180 );

181});

182

183test("an expired signing subkey is rejected even when the signature was created before expiry", async (t) => {

184 const created = new Date(Date.now() - 120_000);

185 const generated = await openpgp.generateKey({

186 type: "ecc",

187 curve: "ed25519Legacy",

188 date: created,

189 userIDs: [{ name: "Expired updater test subkey" }],

190 subkeys: [{ sign: true, keyExpirationTime: 60 }],

191 format: "object"

192 });

193 const bytes = Buffer.from("expired subkey update");

194 const signature = await openpgp.sign({

195 message: await openpgp.createMessage({ binary: bytes }),

196 signingKeys: generated.privateKey,

197 signingKeyIDs: generated.privateKey.getSubkeys()[0].getKeyID(),

198 detached: true,

199 format: "armored",

200 date: new Date(created.getTime() + 30_000)

201 });

202 const fingerprint = normalizeFingerprint(generated.publicKey.getFingerprint());

203 const files = verificationFiles(t, generated.publicKey.armor(), bytes, signature);

204 await assert.rejects(

205 () => verifierFor(files, fingerprint).verifyFile(files.artifactPath, files.signaturePath),

206

    (error) => ["UPDATE_SIGNATURE_INVALID", "UPDATE_SIGNATURE_UNTRUSTED_SIGNER", "UPDATE_SIGNING_SUBKEY_INVALID"].includes(error.code)

207 );

208});

209

210test("a revoked primary key is rejected before artifact verification", async (t) => {

211 const fixture = await fixtures();

212 const bytes = Buffer.from("revoked primary update");

213 const signature = await detachedSignature(fixture.trustedPrivateArmor, bytes);

214 const privateKey = await openpgp.readPrivateKey({ armoredKey: fixture.trustedPrivateArmor });

215 const revokedKey = await privateKey.revoke(

216 { flag: openpgp.enums.reasonForRevocation.keyRetired, string: "Updater test primary revocation" },

217 new Date()

218 );

219 const files = verificationFiles(t, revokedKey.toPublic().armor(), bytes, signature);

220 await assert.rejects(

221 () => verifierFor(files, fixture.trustedFingerprint).verifyFile(files.artifactPath, files.signaturePath),

222 (error) => error.code === "UPDATE_PUBLIC_KEY_INVALID"

223 );

224});

225

226test("a signing subkey with a corrupted binding signature is rejected", async (t) => {

227 const fixture = await fixtures();

228 const bytes = Buffer.from("invalid binding update");

229 const signature = await detachedSignature(fixture.trustedPrivateArmor, bytes, 0);

230 const publicKey = await openpgp.readKey({ armoredKey: fixture.trustedPublicArmor });

231 publicKey.subkeys[0].bindingSignatures[0].params.r[0] ^= 1;

232 const files = verificationFiles(t, publicKey.armor(), bytes, signature);

233 await assert.rejects(

234 () => verifierFor(files, fixture.trustedFingerprint).verifyFile(files.artifactPath, files.signaturePath),

235

    (error) => ["UPDATE_SIGNATURE_INVALID", "UPDATE_SIGNATURE_UNTRUSTED_SIGNER", "UPDATE_SIGNING_SUBKEY_INVALID"].includes(error.code)

236 );

237});

238

239test("a verification exception fails closed", async (t) => {

240 const fixture = await fixtures();

241 const bytes = Buffer.from("exception update");

242 const signature = await detachedSignature(fixture.trustedPrivateArmor, bytes);

243 const files = verificationFiles(t, fixture.trustedPublicArmor, bytes, signature);

244 const openpgpImpl = { ...openpgp, verify: async () => { throw new Error("simulated verifier failure"); } };

245 await assert.rejects(

246

    () => verifierFor(files, fixture.trustedFingerprint, { openpgpImpl }).verifyFile(files.artifactPath, files.signaturePath),

247 (error) => error.code === "UPDATE_SIGNATURE_INVALID"

248 );

249});

250

251test("a verification timeout fails closed", async (t) => {

252 const fixture = await fixtures();

253 const bytes = Buffer.from("timeout update");

254 const signature = await detachedSignature(fixture.trustedPrivateArmor, bytes);

255 const files = verificationFiles(t, fixture.trustedPublicArmor, bytes, signature);

256 const openpgpImpl = { ...openpgp, verify: () => new Promise(() => {}) };

257 await assert.rejects(

258 () => verifierFor(files, fixture.trustedFingerprint, {

259 openpgpImpl,

260 verificationTimeoutMs: 20

261 }).verifyFile(files.artifactPath, files.signaturePath),

262 (error) => error.code === "UPDATE_SIGNATURE_TIMEOUT"

263 );

264});

265

266test("a missing bundled public key fails closed", async (t) => {

267 const fixture = await fixtures();

268 const bytes = Buffer.from("missing key update");

269 const signature = await detachedSignature(fixture.trustedPrivateArmor, bytes);

270 const files = verificationFiles(t, fixture.trustedPublicArmor, bytes, signature);

271 fs.unlinkSync(files.publicKeyPath);

272 await assert.rejects(

273 () => verifierFor(files, fixture.trustedFingerprint).verifyFile(files.artifactPath, files.signaturePath),

274 (error) => error.code === "UPDATE_SIGNATURE_FILE_MISSING"

275 );

276});

277

278test("installer flow cannot start before main-process verification", async () => {

279 const selected = {

280 id: "release-1",

281 version: "0.0.2",

282 publishedAt: "2026-08-13T12:00:00Z",

283 filename: "update.exe",

284 size: 6,

285 sha512: "a".repeat(128)

286 };

287 const configStore = {

288 get: () => ({ updates: { channel: "alpha", lastLaunchedRelease: null } }),

289 recordLaunchedRelease() { throw new Error("must not record"); }

290 };

291 const provider = {

292 async listReleases() { return { releases: [selected], sourceBaseUrl: "https://updates.example/" }; },

293 async downloadAndVerify() {

294

      return { path: "/tmp/update.exe", filename: "update.exe", size: 6, sha512: selected.sha512, signatureVerified: false };

295 },

296 async reverifyForInstall() { throw new Error("must not be called"); }

297 };

298 const service = new UpdateService({

299 appVersion: "0.0.1",

300 platform: "win32",

301 arch: "x64",

302 configStore,

303 providerFactory: () => provider

304 });

305 await service.check();

306 await assert.rejects(() => service.prepareInstallerLaunch(), /No verified update/);

307 await assert.rejects(() => service.download(), /mandatory OpenPGP verification/);

308 assert.throws(() => service.markInstallerLaunched(), /No verified update/);

309});

310

311test("installer launch is authorized only after the main process re-verifies the tracked artifact", async () => {

312 const selected = {

313 id: "release-2",

314 version: "0.0.2",

315 publishedAt: "2026-08-13T12:00:00Z",

316 filename: "update.exe",

317 size: 6,

318 sha512: "b".repeat(128)

319 };

320 let recorded = null;

321 let reverifyCalls = 0;

322 const provider = {

323 async listReleases() { return { releases: [selected], sourceBaseUrl: "https://updates.example/" }; },

324 async downloadAndVerify() {

325 return {

326 path: "/private/cache/update.exe",

327 signaturePath: "/private/cache/update.exe.asc",

328 filename: selected.filename,

329 size: selected.size,

330 sha512: selected.sha512,

331 signatureVerified: true,

332 primaryFingerprint: "0".repeat(40),

333 signingFingerprints: ["1".repeat(40)]

334 };

335 },

336 async reverifyForInstall(download, release) {

337 reverifyCalls += 1;

338 assert.equal(download.path, "/private/cache/update.exe");

339 assert.equal(release.id, selected.id);

340 return download.path;

341 }

342 };

343 const service = new UpdateService({

344 appVersion: "0.0.1",

345 platform: "win32",

346 arch: "x64",

347 configStore: {

348 get: () => ({ updates: { channel: "alpha", lastLaunchedRelease: null } }),

349 recordLaunchedRelease(value) { recorded = value; }

350 },

351 providerFactory: () => provider

352 });

353 await service.check();

354 await service.download();

355 assert.throws(() => service.markInstallerLaunched(), /No verified update/);

356 assert.equal(await service.prepareInstallerLaunch(), "/private/cache/update.exe");

357 service.markInstallerLaunched();

358 assert.equal(reverifyCalls, 1);

359 assert.equal(recorded.id, selected.id);

360});

361

362test("renderer API cannot provide paths, keys, fingerprints, or verified=true", () => {

363 const preload = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, "..", "src", "preload", "corePreload.js"), "utf8");

364 const ipc = fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, "..", "src", "main", "ipc", "registerCoreIpc.js"), "utf8");

365 assert.match(preload, /downloadUpdate:\s*\(\)\s*=>\s*ipcRenderer\.invoke\("updates:download"\)/);

366 assert.match(preload, /installUpdate:\s*\(\)\s*=>\s*ipcRenderer\.invoke\("updates:install"\)/);

367 assert.match(ipc, /await updateService\.prepareInstallerLaunch\(\)/);

368

  assert.doesNotMatch(preload, /verificationSuccess|signaturePath|publicKeyPath|trustedPrimaryFingerprint|verified\s*:/);

369});

370

SHA-256: ca639caa9c7272526a6e2802f212a45336a4fa7c80cca0a85d9d5633c2e63d96

SHA-256 des Archivs: 5ac91caf4fa32a6fdb114f2430deed486fbe7489d5eea343d1f034169fafb5e0